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Abstract
“Beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is a phase that exemplifies the subjectivity of
attractiveness. In recent years, researchers in the fields of economics, sociology, and anaplasty
have used symmetry analysis in an attempt to make beauty an objective issue. People
characterized by greater facial symmetry, as defined by exhibiting balanced lateral proportions,
are considered to be more attractive. Furthermore, labor economists, such as Hamermesh and
Biddle (1994), suggest a wage premium for more attractive individuals, however, the measure of
attractiveness was not based on symmetry. This study examines the effect of NFL quarterbacks‟
attractiveness on their salaries, holding productivity constant. One may hypothesize that the
general manager of a NFL team would benefit by hiring a more attractive quarterback, ceteris
paribus. This benefit could be seen through the creation of a bandwagon effect to sell more
tickets and team paraphernalia thus increasing profits. Increasing attention in the literature is
being paid to the effects of beauty in the labor market. This study seeks to utilized productivity
measures of NFL quarterbacks in conjunction with their attractiveness ratings to predict the true
impact of beauty.

Introduction
“Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Margaret Wolfe Hungerford, under the pseudonym „The
Dutchess,‟ coined this phrase in 1878. Benjamin Franklin, William Shakespeare, and David
Hume each contributed their own versions of this proverb to the literary world as well. Each
great mind relayed a common message: beauty is a subjective issue. People of differing cultures
define beauty according to the social norms and values which they uphold. For example, the
Ubangi tribe of Africa believes a beautiful characteristic of a woman is to have a protruding
lower lip. In order to accentuate this feature, they insert discs in women‟s lips during childhood
development. This is much akin to the feet-binding custom which is practiced in subsets of
Chinese societies. However, numerous sociological studies denote symmetry as a universal
indicator of beauty (Gunes 2006, Scheib 1999, Whitehill 2008). From birth, people are
instinctively drawn to symmetrical entities (Samuels 1994).
In recent years, researchers in the fields of economics, sociology, and anaplasty (application of
reconstructive surgery) have used symmetry analysis as a method to make beauty an objective
issue. People characterized by greater facial symmetry, as defined by exhibiting balanced lateral
proportions, are considered to be more attractive. Furthermore, labor economists, such as
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), suggest a wage premium for more attractive individuals,
however, the measure of attractiveness was not based on symmetry. To test this wage premium
hypothesis, comprehensive data sets including productivity measurements, obtainable pictures
2
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for symmetry analysis, and the individuals‟ salaries are necessary. The National Football League
(NFL) provides productivity measures on all its players and provides salary information that is
available to the public. Given easily obtainable pictures of the players, symmetry analysis,
leading to an objective measure of beauty, is attainable. Additionally, this NFL data can then be
used to test the wage premium hypothesis.
This study examines the effect of NFL quarterbacks‟ attractiveness on their salaries, holding
productivity constant. One may hypothesize that the general manager of a NFL team would
benefit by hiring a more attractive quarterback, ceteris paribus. This benefit could be seen
through the creation of a bandwagon effect to sell more tickets and team paraphernalia thus
increasing profits. Increasing attention in the literature is being paid to the effects of beauty in
the labor market. This study seeks to utilized productivity measures of NFL quarterbacks in
conjunction with their attractiveness ratings to predict the true impact of beauty.
Literature Review
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines beauty as, “the quality or aggregate of qualities in a
person or thing that gives pleasure to the senses or pleasurably exalts the mind or spirit.”
However, determining which qualities provide such gratifying sentiments varies for each
individual. Research in the field of sociology indicates that facial symmetry is a way in which
beauty can be universally defined. Through the refined technology of symmetry processing tools,
researchers have been able to quantify one‟s facial symmetry. As a result, beauty can be
evaluated in an objective and quantitative manner. Beauty, or lack thereof, is a quality which
every person possesses. Furthermore, it is a quality which has been shown to affect a person
throughout his or her life. Whether this impact if found through human capital formation, or
discrimination within the labor market, examination of one‟s beauty is worthy of consideration.
The following sections will further define beauty and outline the past research done in specific
areas of facial symmetry.
Universal Beauty
Beauty has no intrinsic, set meaning. Each person defines beauty based on his or her preference.
Meanwhile, people believe they instinctively know what is generally considered to be beautiful
and conversely, what lacks beauty. This impression is derived by implicit cultural norms.
However, across cultures and time, the consideration of what constitutes the definition of
beautiful greatly varies. As perceptive humans, people are bombarded by the concept of beauty
in a variety of ways. Walking along the street, people find themselves individually critiquing the
beauty in nature, architecture, and each other. As a result of the ubiquitous nature of beauty,
judgment is passed.
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Since beauty is conceived to be subjective to culture, race, and personal preferences, sociological
studies attempt to show how a commonality among these subsets defines beauty. This
commonality is typically found in levels of proportion. Samuels (1994) showed infants pictures
of both symmetrical and asymmetrical faces and objects. The babies in the study paid more
attention to symmetrical faces, indicating attraction to symmetry is a natural instinct.
Furthermore, symmetry has been found to play a large role in sexual attraction. Honekopp et al
(2006) asked a sample of women to rate the attractiveness of 240 men on a scale of 1-7. The high
attractiveness ratings positively correlated with the men who possessed the greatest facial
symmetry. These sociological studies appear to support the concept that correlating symmetry
with beauty is a reasonable notion.
Symmetry: Quantitative Beauty
Beauty can be measured in a quantitative manner when using symmetry as the basis. As a result,
beauty no longer has to be considered completely subjective. Utilizing a digital image processing
tool designed to rate symmetry and comparing the score to the attractiveness ratings assigned to
a sample of 215 individuals, Gunes and Picccardi (2006) found a high correlation between the
human and digital ratings. Individuals considered to be „attractive‟ by the human evaluators were
characterized as having highly symmetrical faces when analyzed by the image processing tool.
This research illustrates the way in which beauty can be quantitatively measured. Despite the
common misconception that beauty is only in the eye of the beholder, using symmetry as the key
element of defining beauty allows for beauty to be conceived in more of a universal manner.
Additional studies, which employed digital imagery analysis, suggest that our definition of
attractiveness is formulated instantaneously. For example, Olson and Marshuetz (2005) asked
subjects to rate the attractiveness of facial pictures shown to them for a fraction of a second. On
several occasions the authors commented, the subjects were unaware that the pictures were of
faces. The researcher concluded that attractiveness, based on symmetry, is determined in an
instant. The interviewees assigned high attractiveness ratings to the symmetrical faces without
knowing the background information about the subject. This lead the authors to deduce that
beauty is determined based on sight without individual characteristics coming into play. Again
this study found that symmetrical faces were appointed higher attractiveness ratings.
Fink et al (2004) attempted to correlate the ratio between the length of the second and fourth
fingers as an indicator of likelihood for facial symmetry. Similar to the symmetry processing tool
utilized in the present study, this research used a picture of a subject‟s face and then used the
center of gravity, the focal point which divides the face into equivalent sectors, to reach a
proportion of symmetry. The highly capable detection ability of the image processing tools used
in such studies has proven to be a key strength of this analysis method. No minimum amount of
symmetry is needed to use the system of placing a picture on the center of gravity and having the
4
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processing tool allow for various alignments. These tools are designed to choose pockets of the
face to study to see if there is symmetry within that designated area (Stentiford, 2005).
Therefore, manual error is reduced by the competence of such software programs.
While the purpose and results of each study addressed above greatly differ with regard to why
researchers are studying facial symmetry, each report shares one commonality pertinent to this
research topic which is quantifying beauty. These studies are able to link technological ratings of
attractiveness, as defined by symmetry, to human perception of attractiveness, ultimately
generating a significant level of correlation. This is helpful in expounding why symmetry is
chosen as the method of making beauty an objective, not subjective, matter.
Impact of Beauty
From birth, beauty impacts a person‟s life. Better-looking babies have been found to receive
more attention from nurses. Lavoie (1974) and Clifford and Walster (1973) found that teachers
treat more attractive students with more favorable treatment than those whom are less fortunate
looking. The overall schooling experience of more attractive children is affected in terms of both
teacher and peer interactions. These students are more likely to receive favorable treatment by
both their teachers and peers, based on being more attractive. Stalcup (2002) focuses her
research on the effects of beauty particularly in western culture. She calls on Hamermesh and
Biddle (1994) to support her theory that despite cultural preferences, there is generally a
consensus on what is considered beautiful at a given point in time within a culture. Beauty has
become so engrained in our culture that at mock trials, prettier people are given lighter sentences
(Beck and Tiene,1989) and people have been proven to be more easily persuaded by more
attractive people (Buck and Tiene,1989). Alarmingly, prettier people have a greater likelihood of
being aided in emergencies (Juhnke et al, 1989).
By studying one‟s level of attractiveness, researchers have gained a better understanding of its
outcome on human capital formation. High school beauty is positively correlated to a student‟s
overall experience as shown by higher GPAs, more attention received from teachers, and less
likelihood of suspension (Cialdini, et al. 1984). As a result of this unequal treatment, betterlooking students gain greater confidence, social skills, and communication capabilities. The
combination of these beneficial outcomes leads to higher wages in the labor market. For the less
attractive students, the inequitable treatment decreases the person‟s human capital formation.
Mekin and Tocan (2005) note that unattractive high school students are less likely to enter the
labor market and more likely to engage in criminal activity. Plainly stated, exhibiting aboveaverage looks prior to one‟s entry into the labor market has been proven to enhance a person‟s
treatment by peers and mentors, ultimately affecting one‟s socio-economic status through
positive human capital formation
5
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Beauty in the Labor Market
The definition of lookism as defined by Fred Siegel (1991) is “the construction of a standard for
beauty/attractiveness.” While attractiveness is not accounted for under the laws of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), many contend it should be due to the premium for beauty and
penalty for lack thereof. The ADA considers disability to be the “public perception of
impairment,” not necessarily the impairment itself. If a lack of beauty does indeed “limit one or
more major life activities,” it can qualify as a disability under the ADA. However, one must also
consider the argument that one‟s looks should be considered natural assets. If this argument were
permitted, then beauty is as much of a natural asset as intelligence is. Therefore, hiring based on
beauty is non-discriminatory. The 1994 study conducted by Hamermesh and Biddle revealed
holding all variables equal, better looking people make more money than average looking
people, creating a wage premium of 5%. Furthermore, below-average looking people earn less
money than the average looking person, accounting for a penalty of 9% amongst men and 4% for
women. Subjective measures of beauty, the rating of one‟s beauty by interviewers, formed the
measurement of beauty in their study.
Height and weight, other indicators of appearance, have also been shown to impact wages. Seng
(1993) found men who are 10% taller than the population average, generate a 6.6 % greater
hourly wage. Race and health were not statistically significant predictors of wages. Regarding
the sensitivity of his model, Seng addresses several possible errors. First, family background
could play a role in his study because people of lower income families may not be privy to the
same nutrition as those of higher income families, therefore increasing one‟s propensity to be
obese, which results in a wage penalty. Second, is the consideration of „mental outlook.‟ If more
attractive people are provided more favorable treatment from a young age, they may take on a
certain attitude which then affects their job performance. For example, if a less fortunate person
is constantly being belittled, he may not be as pleasant or easy-going in team-related
assignments. Furthermore, Seng found a greater penalty for men than women with regard to
below average height and weight standards, ultimately generating lower wages. Seng addresses
the issue that attractiveness can be measured in a number of ways. The most utilized methods
include human ratings based on photographs, interviewer perceptions of a person‟s overall
attractiveness (this would include personality traits), and examining the emphasis on more
quantitative aspects such as weight and height.
With regard to the hiring process, Olson and Marshuetz (2005) indicate the following reasons
why an employer may hire a more attractive individual. First, an above-average looking person is
more likely to be hired because the employer would like to spend more time with the attractive
person (the person may exhibit sexual feelings). Second, the attractiveness exerts an implicit
influence: the good-looking person makes the interviewer feel happy, and therefore, because of
6
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that feeling, the interviewer is more likely to hire the attractive person. These results allow for a
subjective reason to hire someone that is objectively more attractive.
The research conducted by Hamermesh and Biddle (1998) on the effects of beauty in the labor
market provide the basis for the hypothesis of this paper, that exhibiting above-average looks
does, indeed, generate higher wages. The exclusion of physical body attractiveness may be a
limitation of this study, but the innovation of this study is the addition of measuring beauty in an
objective manner. Although Hamermesh and Biddle are able to provide quantitative proof
regarding wage premium and penalties as a result of beauty measurements, their measurement of
beauty required human-ratings rather than digital symmetry analysis measurements. This paper
seeks to explore the effect of beauty on wages, given an objective measure of beauty based on
defining beauty as symmetry.
Symmetry Measurement Overview
In 2002, Dave Davis, with the assistance of Dr. Mike Jones, developed a symmetry measurement
tool.1 The development of this tool is a result of Davis‟s curiosity and research on the
applications of symmetry to realistic situations and dilemmas. Having acknowledged a need for
an online interactive program, he ultimately created Symmeter. Davis‟s interest in this area
piqued as a result of extensive conversations with the co-authors of Reading Faces, a book which
introduces the concept of bilateral symmetry as a measure of facial and personality analysis.
Davis firmly believed that the implementation of bilateral facial symmetry would enhance the
works of these authors. His interest in combining mathematical and technical capabilities
resulted in a program which allows a person to analyze the symmetry of objects.
Symmeter utilizes bilateral and/or radial symmetry to determine the percentage of proportion
comprised by an object or face. In general, symmetry is defined as balanced proportions, or equal
correspondence in the position of parts of an object, based on a median. Bilateral equilibrium is
reached when an object is arranged on an axis so that one plane can divide the object into
identical halves. Slightly distinct, radial equilibrium entails equal portions of an object centered
around a focal point. Whilst the initial intention of this program was to measure the symmetry of
faces, it can also be applied to a variety of objects and industries. According to Davis and patrons
of this tool, uses of Symmeter include, but are not limited to the following: reconstructive
surgery, precious stone segmentation, inspection of mass-produced objects, and academic
purposes. Since its creation in 2002, Symmeter has been used in over a dozen academic research

1

Dave Davis received his Bachelors in Business from Ursinus College. In recent years, he has done extensive work
in the fields of Neuroscience and Biomedical Engineering. Dr. Mike Jones holds a Ph.D. in Computer Vision and
Robotics. See http://www.symmeter.com for more information on this computer package.
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studies. Several recent topics include handedness, correlating criminal behavior with facial
symmetry, and several projects on mandible symmetry for dentistry.
The ease and advanced capabilities of Symmeter make it a highly applicable tool for a variety of
users. Davis‟s design is not constrained by configuration (.jpg only) and size. Furthermore, it
allows the reviewer to set the exact area from which symmetry should be measured. The version
utilized in this study provides two options for selecting the area of interest including both
elliptical and circular. Given that people‟s faces are characterized as being elipse-shaped, the
elliptical option was chosen. Thereafter, the ellipse can be rotated and sized to appropriately
evaluate the selected area. The Symmeter program assigns corresponding pixels to the picture,
creating a mirror-like image. The number of pixels are then calculated and displayed as a
percentage of total pixels within the picture.
Below are examples of objects and faces that have been analyzed through the Symmeter software
and their corresponding symmetry percentages. If a plain circle, such as the one depicted below,
were placed into the software program, it would be assigned a symmetry reading of 1 since the
pixels on either side of the centerline are equal. However, faces are not as perfectly symmetrical.
Therefore, they generate percentages less than 100. Adjacent to the circle is a picture of Tony
Romo, whose face has a relatively high symmetry value. To the right of Romo is a picture of
Elephant man, who is considered to have a super deformity. When analyzed by Symmeter, he
produced a value of approximately 75.28%. The fourth image shows a picture of Doug Flutie,
whose symmetry rating is significantly greater than that of the Elephant Man, yet not as high as
Tony Romo‟s. The values generated by the Symmeter program are generally high. This is to be
expected because people‟s faces are generally symmetrical, unless one has a relatively large
deformity. As a result, the percentages are extremely refined numbers. Dave Davis, creator,
contends that the average person exhibits a facial symmetry reading in the high 80‟s to low 90s.

Circle

Tony Romo

Elephant Man

Doug Flutie
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Symmetry Value:
100%

Symmetry Value:
Symmetry Value:
98.20478530738162% 75.28242925108034%

Symmetry Value:
96.3017589991037 %

Method
Subjects.
Headshot pictures of 312 National Football League quarterbacks from the years 1994-2006
constitute the sample size of this study. The data set is characterized as an unbalanced panel
because the years of data on each player are not identical. For instance, there are 12 distinct
observations for Drew Bledsoe where as there are only three years worth of data on Carson
Palmer. All photographs were retrieved from the NFL homepage and Yahoo Sport, therefore
ensuring comparable picture quality. Supplemental information regarding each players‟
productivity measurements was obtained through the official NFL website. Historical
information was obtained from the NFL annual yearbooks.
Materials and Procedure.
The initial phase of this query was to compile a list of NFL quarterbacks for the selected timeframe. The compiled data set is not restricted to first string players. After assembling a list of 312
players, digital pictures were sought for each subject. Optimal photographs were defined as
frontal-view headshots wherein the subject was neither smiling nor tilted to one direction.
However, the symmetry program is not constrained by smiling or tilting of the head. Upon
extracting pictures of each quarterback from the internet, the program designed by Dave Davis,
Symmeter, was used as the symmetry measurement tool. A photograph of a selected player was
uploaded onto the software‟s website. Thereafter, an ellipse-shaped cropping tool was applied to
more clearly define the area to be analyzed. Vertically, the area consisted of the chin to the
hairline. Horizontally, the entire face was selected, excluding the subject‟s ears. As described in
the previous section of this paper, the Symmeter program was able to analyze the symmetry of
the player‟s face in both a bilateral and radial manner. The number of pixels correlating to the
mirror image of the picture generates a proportion of symmetry. The percentages of these 312
NFL quarterbacks‟ respective facial symmetries range from 99.76 to 82.47. Finally, the players‟
symmetry rating, as a proxy for attractiveness, is added to the regression analysis combined with
other productivity measures model to ultimately derive the impact of beauty on wages, ceteris
paribus.
Theoretical Model
In the game of football there are winners and there are losers. Fans, players, and coaches are
happier being on the winning side of this equation. Although it is in the best interests of the
9
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general manager to hire a quarterback who will be the most productive on the field, the general
manager‟s ultimate goal is to generate the greatest revenues. Therefore, it would be in the best
interest of the general manager of a given NFL team to have a quarterback who is not only
productive but also well-liked by the fans. The general manager will undoubtedly hire the “best”
quarterback that is the most productive quarterback; however, other aspects of a quarterback,
such as his looks, can be viewed as an additional bonus to the general manager. After
consideration of productivity, the quarterback who can create a greater fan base is more likely to
be hired than one who does not possess these characteristics.
From a revenue standpoint, the general manager hires a factor of production that may generate
revenue in two ways: athletic capability and consideration of attractiveness. A more attractive
quarterback could bring more people to the stands, get fans more excited, and create a bandwagon effect. As stated by psychological researcher, Samuels (1994) found that people are
drawn toward more symmetrical beings. Therefore, fans could be more drawn toward
symmetrical, or good-looking, quarterbacks. In the end, these results could lead to more profits.
In terms of economic theory, the marginal revenue product of labor represents the demand curve
for labor. People are in demand because of what they can produce. This production in turn
quantifies to revenue for the firm. Using established productivity measures for a quarterback, we
are able to put a dollar price on this outcome. For example, in terms of football, the quarterback
is “producing” completed passes, touchdowns, rushing yards, all which the fans are willing to
buy. Therefore, the more productive he is, increases his worth to the owner. This increase in
demand can also due to reasons other than marginal revenue and marginal product changing.
Essentially, this increase could theoretically be a result of a quarterback‟s attractiveness. This
attractiveness leads to increasing marginal revenue product for a given productivity level because
of a larger number of endorsements and possible excitement amongst the fans, which could lead
to ticket or team logo sales increases. An increase in the quarterback‟s ability to create this
bandwagon effect could create a higher demand for the player. In the end, this player‟s wage
may increase as well. For example, if the GM is presented with two identically productive
quarterbacks yet one resembles Bret Favre and the other bears a resemblance to Qauzi Motto, the
general manager and the profitability of the team could benefit by hiring the Bret Favre lookalike.
Based on the theories of profit maximization-from the viewpoint of the GM- and marginal
revenue product of labor, quarterbacks conveyed as „good-looking‟ would theoretically increase
their own contract prices in addition to increase the revenue of the team.

Empirical Model
10
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LN SALARYit= B0 + B1(PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENTSit) +B2 (BEAUTY/TIME
INVARIANT CHARACTERISTICSit) +B3 (INDUSTRY TRENDSit) + µit
The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows, given that B2 is defined as the coefficient on
the beauty variable.
H0 : B2 ≤ 0
HA : B2 > 0
This paper seeks to reject the null hypothesis, so as to show that the impact of beauty on a
player‟s salary is greater than zero, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the impact of symmetry is
expected to be greater with regard to secondary quarterbacks. It is hypothesized that, while the
primary quarterbacks are probably hired for their athletic capabilities, the beauty of a secondary
quarterback may bear greater impact on wages because the additional component may be more
important. A general manager would consider hiring a player who is good enough to perform on
the field, given the case of an injury of the starting quarterback, but the role of the secondary
quarterback is twofold. A general manager may take into consideration what can the secondary
quarterback do while sitting on the bench. Public appearances, attending charitable events, and
acting as the „face‟ of the organization are all possible endeavors taken by a secondary
quarterback. Therefore, because sociological and economic studies suggest that people are more
drawn to symmetrical beings, a general manager may likely consider the attractiveness of
secondary quarterbacks. As a result, one would expect the quarterback to be subject to a wage
premium for his looks.
Data
The sample regression function consists of three categories of regressors. First, a player‟s
productivity is assessed through several variables. The second grouping of regressors consists of
time in variant characteristics. The final group includes industry trends. This section outlines the
specific variables which compose these three groupings.
The dependent variable of the sample regression function employed by this study is the log of
quarterback i‟s salary in period t (LSALCAPit). This figure is defined as the base and bonus of a
players‟ salary in a given year. The number deflated by the CPI and stated in terms of 1999
dollars.
Productivity Measurements
To assess the productivity of an individual player, there are several noted statistics which can be
utilized. The NFL created a recognized quarterback rating (QBRAT) equation, known as the
11
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passer rating systems, which is employed in this study. The complete equation is depicted as
follows

COMP
-.3
PASSATT
0.2

+ PASSYDS -3 + PASSTD +.095
PASSATT
PASSATT
4
0.05

-

INT
PASSATT *100
0.04
6

The variables above are defined as:
COMP= Completions
PASSTD= Touchdown passes thrown
PASSATT=Passing attempt

PASSYDS= Yards Passing
INT= Interceptions thrown

Each of the four components of rating calculator ranges from 0-2.375. The quarterback rating is
predicted to have a positively correlated relationship with the player‟s salary. One would assume
that a quarterback with a higher rating would be considered to be more valuable to the team, and
therefore, earn a higher salary.
While the quarterback rating is one measure of a player‟s productivity, additional factors that
measure performance should be included to gain a better understanding of a player‟s athletic
capabilities. Additional measurements of a players‟ prior productivity are included as separate
variables. One of the factors, passing attempts (ATT), is calculated as the number of times a
quarterback attempted to pass the ball in a given season. This variable also provides an indication
of whether a player is a starter or back-up. As a component of performance measurement, one
would expect the relationship between passing attempts and salary to be positive. On average,
starting quarterbacks will likely have more passing attempts, in addition to higher salaries.
An additional way of assessing whether a player is a starter or back-up is to look at the number
of plays in which he was involved. The NFL season is composed of 16 games. Historical
analysis and counter-reference with sports economists suggest that starting quarterbacks, herein
referred to as primary quarterbacks, participate in greater than 200 plays in a given season. If the
12
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quarterback participated in less than 200 plays, he qualifies for the secondary position. These
players are not classified as second-string quarterbacks because the number of plays, as listed in
the data set, does not account for injuries. Although the number of plays is not regressed on
salary, it was used to generate two distinct data sets: primary and secondary quarterbacks.
As a player gains familiarity of the game through greater involvement on the field, one would
expect his productivity to increase. A quarterback‟s total number of years in the NFL is
accounted for in the variable, experience (EXP). Years of experience are classified as number of
years on a team whether or not playing time occurred. One could hypothesize that a player with
greater experience could demand a higher salary but this demand would increase at a decreasing
rate, suggesting a quadratic form.
Players leave teams for several reasons. Whether a player‟s contract matured, he has been
performing sub-par, or he seeks greater playing time elsewhere, it is common in the NFL for
players to be traded (multiple times, on occasion) throughout their professional careers. A study
of NFL salaries by Simmons and Berri (2007) indicates that quarterbacks who have been traded
at least once are more likely to earn lower salaries than those who have never been traded. To
account for this observation, the variable CHANGETEAM has been regressed in this model.
However, the correlation between CHANGETEAM and a player‟s salary could be interpreted in
a number of ways. Due to the flexible impact of this variable, either a positive or negative
correlation with salary is generated. For example back-up quarterback, A.J Feeley, played for the
Philadelphia Eagles when the starting quarterback, Donovan McNabb, got injured. After
performing well for the Eagles, he signed with Miami for the starting position. In this case, his
reasoning for changing teams was twofold: more playing time and a higher salary. This example
illustrates a case in which a player‟s salary is positively related to the CHANGETEAM variable.
The final performance-related characteristic regressed on a quarterback‟s salary is whether the
player has ever been selected to play in a Pro Bowl (PBOWLEVER). This honorary nomination
is a valid indication of a player‟s reputation, and therefore, performance. Six quarterbacks are
selected to play in the Pro Bowl each year. These players are considered to be some of the most
elite and preeminent players in the NFL. Because a general manager would benefit by hiring a
player who has a fine reputation amongst the fans, acquiring a quarterback who has previously
competed in the Pro Bowl would likely increase the demand of a given quarterback. An increase
in demand provides a player with greater bargaining leverage, ultimately increasing his salary.
The relationship between a player who has participated in a Pro Bowl in his professional NFL
career and his salary can be characterized as positively correlated.
Time Invariant Characteristics

13
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Individual characteristics, aside from those related to a player‟s performance, are taken into
account in the sample regression function utilized in this study. The personal attributes examined
are symmetry and race. As stated at the onset of this paper, a higher level of symmetry is
predicted to generate a higher salary. The second attribute, race, is measured using a dummy
variable, BLACK. If a player self reports as an African-American, he is denoted as BLACK. The
remaining players are lumped together as non-black. Sociological studies suggest that black
people, as a whole, earn lower wages than white people. One would assume that this theory
holds true in the football industry, as well. Furthermore, an interaction term, BLACKSYM, tests
the combined effect of being black and one‟s level of symmetry on a player‟s salary. While the
combination of race and symmetry is not the primary focus of this study, one may speculate that
more symmetrical black quarterbacks would be paid less than more symmetrical white
quarterbacks, seeing as race has been proven to have a significant impact on wages across
various industries.
A quarterback‟s innate athletic prowess undoubtedly plays a role in how productive he is.
Although this characteristic is not accounted for in its entirety in this study, the players‟ draft
round (DRAFT1 or DRAFT2) is used as a proxy. By using the DRAFT variable as a regressor in
this study, a quarterback‟s athletic ability prior to entering the NFL can be measured. A player‟s
first year salary can be used as an indication of his worth to the team, as well as a sum of his
predicted future productivity. There are seven draft rounds in the NFL. Previous research
suggests that a quarterback drafted in the first or second round is likely to have a higher salary
than one drafted in round three or more. Consequently, a quarterback who was a first round draft
pick would correlate to the dummy variable, DRAFT1, to be compared to the remaining six
rounds.
Industry Trends
Cyclical changes in the overall economy are accounted for in the dependent salary through the
real salary cap which is deflated by the 1999 CPI. However, in the National Football League, the
collective bargaining agreement is assembled so that the salary cap is a percentage of the total
league revenue. As the revenues of the league increase, the salary cap does as well.
Consequently, all players‟ salaries can fluctuate from one year to the next, regardless of one‟s
productivity or related traits. The change in industry trends is depicted through the YEAR
variable, which simply illustrates of which year the observation denotes. The data ranges from
years 1994-2006, so each observation falls in this time frame.
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Descriptive Statistics: Secondary Quarterbacks
Variable
Symmetry
year
qbrat
att
exp
exp2
changeteam
pbowlever
black
lrsalcap
draft1
draft2

Mean
97.2328556
1999.94
63.8805293
47.6162571
5.8317400
52.7448015
0.2022684
0.1361059
0.1266541
-0.4443547
0.0453686
0.0189036

Std Dev
Minimum
2.3199945
82.4700502
3.7061320
1994.00
31.5884877
0
48.2062154
0
4.4020182
0
73.3059765
0
0.4020715
0
0.3432255
0
0.3328998
0
0.7681912
-3.4362800
0.2083083
0
0.1363135
0

Maximum
99.6671000
2006.00
158.3000000
181.0000000
22.0000000
484.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.9737060
1.0000000
1.0000000

Descriptive Statistics: Primary Quarterbacks
Variable
Symmetry
year
qbrat
att
exp
exp2
changeteam
pbowlever
black
lrsalcap
draft1
draft2

Mean
97.7316636
2000.12
79.0681250
386.5145833
6.9125000
64.6541667
0.2041667
0.4625000
0.1833333
0.8392977
0.1208333
0.0354167

Std Dev
1.8160749
3.6938554
11.9878542
125.5080024
4.1117798
69.0423698
0.4035119
0.4991119
0.3873433
0.8964505
0.3262735
0.1850234

Minimum
91.3304000
1994.00
39.0000000
160.0000000
0
0
0
0
0
-1.4614440
0
0

Maximum
99.7671000
2006.00
121.1000000
691.0000000
20.0000000
400.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
2.6655400
1.0000000
1.0000000

Empirical Findings
As stated in the hypothesis of this paper, we expect to find a greater impact of beauty on wages
amongst secondary quarterbacks, ceteris paribus. To isolate the true impact of beauty on the two
distinct groupings of players, the regression model was run on two data sets: primary
quarterbacks and secondary quarterbacks. Both ordinary least square models and random effects
models were run, as a test to see whether the variable, YEAR, would bear a significant impact on
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the wages. The comprehensive results of the four sample regression models are outlined in Table
1.
Table 1
Variable

Primary OLS

Primary Random
Effects

Secondary OLS

Secondary Random
Effects

Symmetry

0.03083**

.05138*

0.03259

0.03479

(0.02016)
13.20613*
(6.06558)
-0.13429*

(0.02827)
12.37770**
(8.70140)
-0.12570**

(0.01595)
8.61500*
(7.58391)
-0.08684*

(0.01727)
8.50910*
(8.17110)
-0.08581*

(0.06198)
(0.08896)
0.53937
0.46830
Draft1
(0.11491)
(0.11870)
0.03145**
0.06944**
Draft2
(0.17996)
(0.1890)
0.31646
0.42990
Pro Bowler
(0.07803)
(0.08991)
0.21018
0.19910
Experience
(0.03637)
(0.03713)
2
-0.01193
-0.01177
Experience
(0.00202)
(0.00210)
0.00435*
0.00134**
QB Rating
(0.00305)
0.00305
-0.80074
-0.71670
Change Team
(0.08071)
(0.07481)
0.03646
N/A
Year
(0.00879)
N/A
0.00234
0.00189
Attempts
(0.00028)
(0.00028)
*Variable significant at a level of .05
**Variable not statistically significant in this model.
Variables lacking an (*) are significant at a level of .01

(0.07748)
1.31193
(0.14087)
0.32975*
(0.20656)
0.36306
(0.11331)
0.22334
(0.02573)
-0.01197
(0.00165)
0.00182*
(0.00102)
-0.19000
(0.07864)
0.03864
(0.00911)
0.00183
(0.00066)

(0.08353)
1.30440
(0.14800)
0.2783**
(0.2135)**
0.38900
(0.12350)
0.22770
(0.02660)
-0.01226
0.00172
0.001971
(0.00103)
-0.22680
(0.08172)
N/A
N/A
0.00156
(0.00065)

Black
Black*symmetry

A key facet of this data set is the presence of multiple observations for a single player. Certain
characteristics such as symmetry, changing team, and having participated in the Pro Bowl, do not
change over time, while other independent variables change over time. For instance, if a given
quarterback is paid more than average than predicted in one year, it is likely he is paid more than
16
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average the following year, which suggest serial correlation in salaries. Ordinary least squares
assumes that there is no serial correlation. If there is serial correlation, however, it can be taken
into account and remedied to make the estimates more reliable. Pooled ordinary lease squares
regressions do not take serial correlation into account where as the mixed effect model does.
Therefore, a random effects estimator provides consistent results.2
The alternative estimation process is to use a random effects model. Random effects model
assumes that unaccounted for attributes are uncorrelated to other independent variables. For
instance, there are variables such as attitude, drive, and related physical attributes that do not
change for a player. If the error term is serial correlated across time, OLS estimates are not as
precise.
When running a log model, Wooldridge (2006) notes that large beta values yield underestimate
impacts on the dependent variable, and recommends the use of the equation below. When the
beta coefficient is relatively large, there‟s a more exacting formula one uses to find the
percentage change in real wage. This equation was performed on each parameter estimate. The
discussion of the empirical findings addresses a more precise effect of each variable on wage.
The equation, proposed by economist and author, Wooldridge (2006), is as follows.
Adjusted Parameter Estimate = [exp (beta1 *∆ x1 ) -1] *100%
Table 2

2

Variables

Adjusted Primary
Parameter Estimates

Adjusted Secondary
Parameter Estimates

Symmetry
Black
Black*Symmetry
Draft1
Draft2
Pro Bowler
Experience

*
*
-0.12560
0.71490
*
0.37220
0.04630

0.03313
*
0.16980
2.71000
0.39060
0.43770
0.09830

Experience 2
QB Rating
Change Team
Year
Attempts

-0.01219
0.00435
0.55060
0.04576
0.00234

0.01189
0.00183
0.17300
0.03940
0.00183

See Wooldridge p. 490 for more information.
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*Variable not statistically significant.

OLS RESULTS OF SECONDARY QUARTERBACKS
The data of secondary quarterbacks is composed of 402 observations. The final regression
model generated an R2 of .3562, indicating that 35.62% of variation can be accounted for by the
model as shown in Table 2. As a result of running a White‟s test, this model fails to reject
homoskedacity. The overall P-value further suggests there is no heteroskedacity in this model.
The relatively low P-values of the individual variables suggest that they bear a statistically
significant impact on a player‟s salary. One restriction of this model, however, is the presence of
multicollinearity. This is to be expected because of the inclusion of variables such as experience
and experience, and black and black*symmetry.3 Several tests were appended to the analysis to
determine whether such variables should be included in the model. The results indicate that
although there is multicollinearity, these variables contribute to the overall reliability of the
model, and should therefore be incorporated.
As predicted, symmetry has a statistically significant impact on the salary of a secondary
quarterback. When testing the interaction term, black*symmetry, the test results illustrate that the
interaction term should be included in the model, but the interaction with wage is taking place
with the symmetry portion more so than race. The results of regressing salary on symmetry,
made more exact through Wooldridge‟s equation, indicates that a one unit increase in a player‟s
symmetry leads to a predicted 3.3126% salary increase for white quarterbacks. For black
quarterbacks, there is a 20.29% expected increase in salary, ceteris paribus. The average
symmetry level of the observations in the secondary quarterback data set is 97.25. The results of
regressing the interaction term, black*symmetry on salary, indicates that at the mean symmetry
value, black quarterbacks earn 16.98% more than white quarterbacks.
Looking at the draft pick of a secondary quarterback, a quarterback chosen in the first round
(Draft1), relative to those chosen in round three or below, are expected to earn 271% more. The
parameter estimate on this variable (see Table 1) suggests a 131% increase. However, when
using the Wooldridge equation above, the more exact parameter estimate of 2.71 suggest an
impact of 271%. This is the result of the scenario in which a player was a secondary quarterback
but first round draft pick. His base pay when he came into the league would be very high because
3

The first test, B(black)=blacksym=0 generated a t-value of .100, revealing that both variables should be in the
model. The second test, exp=exp2, should also be included because it is represented by a t-value of .0001. This
suggests that the model is better represented by a quadratic form than a linear form with regard to experience. The
third test suggests, in concurrence with previous research by Kahn (1992), that Draft1 and Draft2 should be
represented in the model.
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of his first round draft status. If it turns out that he did not perform to par and, as a result, was not
a primary quarterback despite what the league had envisioned him to be, his pay would decrease
in following years. Therefore, in comparison to the other quarterbacks in the secondary data set,
he is likely to be paid more because of his initial contract. If a quarterback was drafted in the
second round (Draft2), he is predicted to make an average 39.06% more than a player chosen in
the third rounds or below, ceteris paribus.
The impact of a secondary player‟s participation in the Pro Bowl on his salary is straight forward
and coincides with the expected outcome. A player who had ever partaken in this honorary game
is expected to make 43.77% more than a player who has never been elected to play in this game.
The Pro Bowl is a sign of prestige. Being elected to play in this game illustrates which players
are considered to be the best in their respective positions. This salary premium is likely the result
of a general manager wanting to hire a player who has been known for being the best, or most
productive, at some point in his career. Such a player would likely have gathered a wide fan
base, as well, which would contribute to the team‟s revenue.
Including experience and experience2 as a quadratic in the final regression function produced
statistically significant results in the expected direction. Until 9.77 years of experience, each
additional year of experience increases wages at a decreasing rate. After reaching this point of
threshold, each extra year of experience decreases the wage of a secondary quarterback at an
increasing rate. The drop each year is greater. This outcome is to be expected because as the
quarterbacks are getting older, they are less productive, therefore less valuable. The average
years of experience for secondary quarterbacks are 5.83 years. At this level, an additional year of
experience in the NFL is expected to increase a player‟s wage by 9.83%.
Compared to the other independent variables regressed on salary, a quarterback‟s rating did not
bear as great of an impact as expected. A one point increase in the rating is expected to increase a
player‟s salary by 0.182%. The disparity of QB-rating‟s in this data set ranges from 63-158, with
a standard deviation of 31. Therefore, an increase of one standard deviation (30 points) leads to a
5.61% increase in wage. The actual sign of this coefficient corresponds with the expected sign,
but the actual impact is less than expected. Multicollinearity with related productivity
measurements may be the result of this finding.
An additional measure of productivity which is expected to positively affect a players‟ salary is
passing attempts. Similar, to quarterback rating, attempts are not realistically measured in one
point increases. Therefore, the impact is stated when examining an increase of one standard
deviation, 48 units. If a secondary quarterback has 48 more attempts (like playing one more
game), his salary is predicted to increase an average of 9.18%.
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The ambiguous nature of interpreting whether a player‟s expected salary would increase or
decrease due to having changed teams at some point in his career is refined by the outcome of
running the OLS model. Amongst the secondary quarterbacks, if a player changes teams at least
once in his professional career, his predicted salary is expected to decrease by 17.30%. One may
assume that this conclusion is the result of a player changing teams as a sign of demotion rather
than promotion. Old age, lasting injury, or poor attitude may contribute to a player changing
teams, and therefore earning a lesser salary. Finally, when quarterbacks are traded, they are
walking away from a significant bonus. The lack of a signing-bonus is accounted for in a
percentage decrease.
The variable, „year,‟ which tests for changes in the industry, was expected to have a greater
impact within the random effects model. With regard to the OLS model, wages of players as a
whole are expected to increase by 3.94%. This effect is likely picking up on the changes in the
industry revenues and salary caps.
OLS RESULTS OF PRIMARY QUARTERACKS
The primary quarterback data set is composed of 443 observations. The adjusted R2 of the model
suggests that 50.07% of the variation is accounted for by the model. According to the White‟s
test, the model is not restricted by heteroskedacity. Further tests indicate that the interaction
term, black*symmetry, and correlating this variable with both black and symmetry, alone,
enhances the predictability of the model. Interestingly, the change in salary given a one unit
increase in symmetry is different for black quarterbacks and white quarterbacks. This
phenomenon is not evident amongst secondary quarterbacks.
The principal variable of this study, symmetry, yields results that concur with the hypothesis.
The relatively high p-value on the symmetry coefficient indicates that this variable is not
significant. As previously stated, one would not expect to see an increase in wage amongst
primary quarterbacks because their wage relies nearly solely on their athletic capabilities.
Within the primary data set, at the mean symmetry level of 97.73, there is no discrepancy in the
expected earnings of black and white quarterbacks. In the secondary data set, black quarterbacks
were earning more.
Primary quarterbacks drafted in the first round (Draft1) are expected to earn 71.49% greater than
those drafted in rounds three and below. As indicated by a relatively high p-value, the Draft2
variable is not statistically significant. The reasons for a first round draft pick earning more than
those in successive rounds hold true for both primary and secondary quarterbacks: they are
expected to be more productive on the field, therefore generating a greater fan base which leads
to an increase in ticket sales and overall team revenue.
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Akin to the predicted outcome of a player having been chosen to play in the Pro Bowl, the
adjusted parameter estimate of this variable suggests that election to play in this game increases
the expected wage of a primary quarter back by 37.22%. Interestingly, the impact is greater
amongst secondary quarterbacks.
The experience of a quarterback, measured as a quadratic, is an additional statistically significant
variable regressed on a player‟s salary. Until 8.81 years of experience, the expected wage
increases at a decreasing rate. After 8.81 years, one‟s salary is expected to decreases at an
increasing rate. The threshold level of 8.81 years is lower than that of the secondary
quarterbacks. Overall, each additional year of experience is assumed to augment the real salary
of a primary quarterback by 4.63%. Both the sign and direction of the coefficient on this variable
are in accord to the hypothesis and previous research.
Generally speaking, the players with the strongest and most accurate arms attempt to throw the
ball most often. Assuming such accuracy and strength are adequately portrayed on the field,
these players are also commonly thought of as the best players. Attempts are generally not
measured in terms of one-unit increases. Rather, by looking a change in one standard deviation,
125 attempts, the expected salary of a primary quarterback is predicted to increase by 33.97%.
Examining the expected salary change by means of a one-standard deviation increase is utilized
with regard to quarterback rating as well. The standard deviation of quarterback rating is 12 unit
points. For every 12 unit increase, or one standard deviation from the mean, in the quarterback
rating, the expected salary of a primary player increases by 5.35%. This statistically significant
impact concurs with the hypothesis stated from the onset of this paper. As a key measure of
productivity, the quarterback rating is expected to have a significantly positive correlation to the
wage of a primary quarterback.
The final variable regressed on salary is whether a quarterback ever changed teams at some point
during his professional career. As illustrated in Table 2, this characteristic is statistically
significant. More specifically, if a primary quarterback ever changed teams, he is expected to
make 55.06% less than one who has never changed teams. As previously state, the reasoning
behind this negatively impacting variable is slightly ambiguous. If someone is considered a good
quarterback, he is likely to stay with the same team. Therefore, those who are traded at some
point in their career, are probably old, have sustained injury, or have poor chemistry with the
current team. Changing teams is not a common theme for NFL quarterbacks; of the 408
individual season observations, 20% changed teams.
RANDOM EFFECTS RESULTS OF SECONDARY QUARTERBACKS
The purpose of running a random effects model was to account for industry changes over time.
Therefore, the variable „year‟ was amended to become a dummy variable to account for years
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1994-2006. Generally speaking, the results generate by the random effects model were similar to
those of the ordinary least squares regression. The results of the random effects models of both
primary and secondary quarterbacks are expressed in Table 1. Significant differences are as
follows. First and foremost, the parameter estimate of symmetry is larger in the random effects
model than in the OLS model, suggesting that as the symmetry of a secondary quarterback
increases by one unit, his expected wage increases by 3.479% for white quarterbacks.
While draft2 became less significant (p-value of .1937), quarterback rating became slightly more
significant and is expressed with a higher magnitude. The relatively low parameter estimates on
the quarterback‟s rating statistic is common in sports economics because this variable often picks
up on team performance, not only player performance.
RANDOM EFFECTS RESULTS OF PRIMARY QUARTERBACKS
With regard to the primary quarterbacks, the random effects model indicates that symmetry is
slightly more statistically significant because it has a p-value of .0702. Were this variable to be
considered significant, one could deduce that as a primary quarterback‟s symmetry level
increases by one unit, his salary is expected to increase by 5.138%. Furthermore, race and race
combined with symmetry readings are also more significant, though the parameter estimates do
not drastically differ.
Whether a quarterback was chosen in the second draft compared to draft three or below, his
salary is not expected to differ. In conjunction with the results of the OLS model, the draft2
variable is not significant in the random effects model either. Interestingly, the OLS model
indicated that if a primary quarterback had ever been selected to play in a Pro Bowl, his expected
salary was likely to increase by 37.22%. The random effects model results suggest that said
player‟s salary is actually likely to increase by 42.99%.
In conclusion, few parameter estimates differ when generating a random effects model and
ordinary least squares regression. Moreover, the signs of each coefficient remain the same. The
initial assumption that secondary quarterbacks would likely see greater salaries as a result of
their symmetry ratings, and that primary quarterbacks would not be as greatly affected, hold true
in both models.
Conclusion
As predicted, the wages of NFL quarterbacks are not entirely derived by their ability to perform
on the field. Additional factors such as race, looks, and industry trends play part in determining
their contract prices. By using symmetry analysis to quantify a players‟ attractiveness, it is
concluded that the salary of a secondary quarterback is predicted to increase by approximately
3.3% for every one unit increase in his symmetry rating.
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A common theme in sports studies is the prevalence of a relatively low R2. This is the result of
difficulty in differentiating the productivity of a player versus that of the team. Additional
limitations of this study include the presence of unobserved variables in the disturbance term.
Several contributing factors include a player‟s natural football sense, attitude, chemistry with
teammates, and overall charisma. The existence of such factors leads to potentially biased
results. Furthermore, it may be helpful to know when players‟ contracts were renegotiated or set,
to account for changes in industry trends.
Beauty does have an impact in society at large, as indicated in the literature review section of this
paper. Therefore, this topic could be applied to various industries. For example, part of CEO
compensation may be attributed to one‟s looks. Data in which there is public access to salary,
productivity measurements, and photographs would allow a researcher to conduct a similar
study.
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